In a previous blog entry posted a few weeks ago, I spent a good deal of time musing about how Reza Shah's secularizing reforms eventually lead to the Islamic Republican government that hold power in Iran today. Up until class today, I knew very little about the Iranian Revolution that occurred in 1979. The history of the revolution is seemingly extremely complex and was in the works for many years before actually coming to full fruition. It seems to me, although Iranians had issues with their government since Reza Shah first overthrew the Qajar Dynasty, that Mohammad Reza Shah's "White Revolution" was a major catalyst of social revolt.
From what I understand--through the Cleveland reading and the documentaries shown in class--the White Revolution was intended to change the socio-economic climate in Iran to one that would more greatly benefit the country's people. Many of the reforms varied from Reza Shah's reforms because they were not all geared toward catapulting Iran into secularization and modernity. In fact, the reforms set in place by the White Revolution seemed much more focused on how to better life for Iranian citizens living in the country. Programs were established for needy mothers, water sources were nationalized, and measures were taken in order to combat corruption in the bureaucratic government system.
It was right after the failure of the White Revolution when Ayatollah Khomeini first appeared as a legitimate political activist and leader. When considering the question posed in class today--"did the Iranian revolution result from the citizens' desires or from the encouragement of Ayatollah Khomeini"--it is really a tough question to tackle. Citizens' irritation with the government (because of failed land reforms) arouse right around the same time Khomeini began speaking out in favor of a religious republic. I think that the Iranian people were unhappy with Mohammad Reza Shah's government because it did not support how they wanted to live their everyday lives, and were therefore susceptible to accepting leadership from Khomeini (even though their agendas were not necessarily synonymous).
Thursday, April 23, 2009
Monday, April 20, 2009
Smith's Lecture
I am glad that we are actually learning about the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although it has inevitably come up in class discussions and videos (seemingly because it is currently the most popular conflict in the Middle East and is consequently one in which the majority of people are comfortable discussing), this is the first time that we have really learned about specifics. In previous classes in which the Arab-Israeli conflict has come up, the focus has mainly been on how the conflict affects those who currently live in Palestine and Israel, and how their perceptions of the fighting are similar/different.
Now that the history of the struggle is being thoroughly explored, it seems absurd to me that at several points throughout history, the Israelis have tried to completely illegitimize the Palestinians. I think this speaks loads to the cultural hegemony that surrounds the entire conflict. Israel (as a modern state) was a created just a few decades ago, and no one questions their claim to be there. The Palestinians, however, lived in the Palestine region for thousands of years and have just recently been displaced. I never realized until reading the Smith book and watching his lecture that so many Palestinian refugees were forced to relocate themselves to Syria, Jordan, and other countries. By moving out Palestinians and moving in Jews to live in Israel, the Israeli leaders have overwhelmingly inculcated the idea that Palestine no longer exists into the minds of most global citizens.
I honestly have trouble understanding how anyone with a thorough understanding of the conflict can recognize Israel as a legitimate world power. I also have trouble understanding how the Western powers involved in the Zionist movement and the nation building in the late nineteenth century allowed such vague, noncommittal resolutions to pass. Creating a new state is a difficult process that leaves little room for error and abstraction.
Now that the history of the struggle is being thoroughly explored, it seems absurd to me that at several points throughout history, the Israelis have tried to completely illegitimize the Palestinians. I think this speaks loads to the cultural hegemony that surrounds the entire conflict. Israel (as a modern state) was a created just a few decades ago, and no one questions their claim to be there. The Palestinians, however, lived in the Palestine region for thousands of years and have just recently been displaced. I never realized until reading the Smith book and watching his lecture that so many Palestinian refugees were forced to relocate themselves to Syria, Jordan, and other countries. By moving out Palestinians and moving in Jews to live in Israel, the Israeli leaders have overwhelmingly inculcated the idea that Palestine no longer exists into the minds of most global citizens.
I honestly have trouble understanding how anyone with a thorough understanding of the conflict can recognize Israel as a legitimate world power. I also have trouble understanding how the Western powers involved in the Zionist movement and the nation building in the late nineteenth century allowed such vague, noncommittal resolutions to pass. Creating a new state is a difficult process that leaves little room for error and abstraction.
Sunday, April 12, 2009
Reza Shah
In preparation for our upcoming essays on Touba and the Meaning of Night, the past few class lectures, discussions and assigned readings have centered on Iran and it's drastic reforms during the beginning of the twentieth century. Many changes occurred during this time period, all in the name of modernity. In order to keep up with the innovations going on in Europe, Iran hoped to conform to the European standard of modernity. In order to ensure that Iran could essentially "keep up" with the innovations and progress in the West, Reza Shah drastically reformed many of the country's major institutions. Many changes centered on women, and changing their roles in society from not only wives and mothers, but also to students and active members of the workforce. In order to kickstart these changes for women, Reza Shah opened state sponsored schools for girls and forced all Iranian women to unveil. These changes and the overall desire to broaden womens' roles was precipitated by what is commonly referred to as "the woman question." Western powers suggested that Iran had trouble establishing modernity because of the way in which it treated its women. This suggestion was really a testament to the strong governing power Islam held in the country, and men were affected by modernizing reforms as well.
It is very clear that almost all of Reza Shah's reforms had to do with secularization of government and government institutions. What confuses me, however, is that modern day Iran is a very religious state. I know that all children born in Iran are automatically considered Muslim, and the country's governing system is essentially a theocracy. Religious leaders hold gratuitous amounts of power and religious law sets the foundation for most political laws as well. I don't quite understand where the principles set by Reza Shah's secularizing reforms changed to strict religious doctrine.
It is very clear that almost all of Reza Shah's reforms had to do with secularization of government and government institutions. What confuses me, however, is that modern day Iran is a very religious state. I know that all children born in Iran are automatically considered Muslim, and the country's governing system is essentially a theocracy. Religious leaders hold gratuitous amounts of power and religious law sets the foundation for most political laws as well. I don't quite understand where the principles set by Reza Shah's secularizing reforms changed to strict religious doctrine.
Saturday, April 4, 2009
Muhammad Ali Pasha
In preparation for the midterm examination, I read over a lot of course material from earlier in the curriculum. One of the more fascinating pieces was Roger Owen's article Muhammad Ali: A View from the New World. His work examined the life of Muhammad Ali Pasha and also analyzed the Egyptian population's opinion of him. I was pretty surprised about everything he had to say. I learned from class discussion and the Cleveland text book that Muhammad Ali was the one to essentially usher Egypt into the modern age. He was the first to successfully instate a modern military and to promote huge expenditures in order to keep up with European innovations. After reiterating all of this in his article, Owen continues on to explain that modern Egyptians still love him for all of this. I was surprised to hear him draw this conclusion because all of Muhammad Ali's reforms lead directly into Egypt falling into Bankruptcy, and consequently under British control. I understand that he was followed by a slew of significantly weaker leaders that were ultimately responsible for complete crash of the Egyptian economic system, but I find it hard to believe that modern Egyptians are pleased with the man that set the precedents that lead to the bankruptcy.
I was also surprised that Owen found it worthy to comment on how Muhammad Ali was not an Egyptian, but was still revered and respected. At that point in history, Egyptian nationalism was not a significant force. Napoleon had just attempted to convince the Egyptian population that the Ottomans were foreign, despotic leaders, and that it would be an insult to their "Egyptianness" not to rebel against them. Needless to say--his efforts went unheeded. Egyptians of the period considered themselves more Ottoman than Egyptian. Nationalism became a strong force later, after the Europeans had more time to infiltrate the Empire and introduce Western ideas.
I was also surprised that Owen found it worthy to comment on how Muhammad Ali was not an Egyptian, but was still revered and respected. At that point in history, Egyptian nationalism was not a significant force. Napoleon had just attempted to convince the Egyptian population that the Ottomans were foreign, despotic leaders, and that it would be an insult to their "Egyptianness" not to rebel against them. Needless to say--his efforts went unheeded. Egyptians of the period considered themselves more Ottoman than Egyptian. Nationalism became a strong force later, after the Europeans had more time to infiltrate the Empire and introduce Western ideas.
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